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Abstract
We consider mechanisms for markets that are double-sided and have players with multi-
dimensional strategic spaces on at least one side. The players of the market are strategic,
and act to optimize their own utilities. The mechanism designer, on the other hand, aims to
optimize a social goal, i.e., the gain from trade. We focus on one example of this setting which
is motivated by the foreseeable future form of online advertising.
Online advertising currently supports some of the most important Internet services, includ-
ing: search, social media and user generated content sites. To overcome privacy concerns, it
has been suggested to introduce user information markets through information brokers into the
online advertising ecosystem. Such markets give users control over which data get shared in
the online advertising exchange. We describe a model for the above foreseeable future form of
online advertising, and design two mechanisms for the exchange of this model: a deterministic
mechanism which is related to the vast literature on mechanism design through trade reduction
and allows players with a multi-dimensional strategic space, and a randomized mechanism which
can handle a more general version of the model.
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1 Introduction
Billions of transactions are carried out via exchanges at every given day, and the number of trans-
actions and exchanges continues to grow as the need for competitiveness promotes adoption. The
design of one-sided incentive compatible (truthful bidding) mechanisms for exchanges is relatively
well understood. However, incentive compatible multi-sided mechanisms present a significantly
more challenging problem as they introduce more sophisticated requirements such as budget bal-
ance.
More specifically, we are interested in designing exchanges (mechanisms) for multi-sided markets
with strategic players. The players of the market are strategic, and act to optimize their own
utilities. The mechanism designer, on the other hand, aims to optimize a social goal, i.e., the gain
from trade (the difference between the total value of the sold goods for the buyers and the total costs
of these goods for the sellers). The design of such mechanisms raises a few interesting questions. Can
the mechanism maintain simultaneously different desirable economic properties such as: individual
rationality (IR)—participants do not lose by participation, incentive compatibility (IC)—players
are incentivized to report their true information to the mechanism and budget balance (BB)—the
mechanism does not end up with a loss. Moreover, can the mechanism maintain these properties
while suffering only a bounded loss compared to the optimal gain from trade? Finally, can this be
done when all the players have a multi-dimensional strategic space?1
The above questions can be studied in the context of many multi-sided markets. We focus
on one such market, and leave the consideration of other multi-sided markets for future work.
The market we consider is motivated by online advertising in its foreseeable future form. Online
advertising currently supports some of the most important Internet services, including: search,
social media and user generated content sites. However, the amount of information that companies
collect about users increasingly creates privacy concerns in society as a whole, and even more so
in the European society. In recent years EU regulators have actively been looking for solutions to
guarantee that users’ privacy is preserved. In particular, the EU regulators have been looking for
tools that enable the end user to configure their privacy settings so that only information allowed
by the end-user is collected by online advertising platforms.
The market we study is induced by a new solution we suggest for the above privacy issue. In
this solution mediators serve as the interface between end-users and the other players in the online
advertising market. Each user informs his mediator of the attributes she is willing to reveal, and
her cost, i.e., the compensation she requires for every ad she views. The mediator then tries to
“sell” the user on the advertising market based only on the attributes she agreed to reveal, and, if
successful, pays her the appropriate cost out of the amount he got from the sell.
As revealing more attributes is likely to result in a more profitable sale, our solution provides
incentives for users to share their information with the advertising market while allowing users to
retain control of the amount of information they would like to share. Notice that the fact that
our solution motivates users to participate in the advertising market, and even to provide more
precise information for targeting campaigns, means that our solution improves the efficiency of
the advertising system and the digital economy as a whole (in addition to answering the privacy
concerns discussed above). This is in sharp contrast to other natural approaches for dealing with
privacy issues, such as cryptography based approaches, which reduce the amount of information
available to the advertisers but give them nothing in return.
The advertising market induced by the above solution has mediators on one side, and advertisers
on the other side. Each mediator has a set of users associated with him, and he is trying to assign
1We often refer to players with a multi-dimensional strategic space as multi-dimensional players.
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these users to advertisers using the market. Each one of the users has a non-negative cost which
she has to be paid if she is assigned to an advertiser. The mediators themselves have no cost of
their own, however, each of them has to pay his users their cost if they are assigned to advertisers.
Thus, the utility of a mediator is the amount paid to him minus the total cost of his users that are
assigned. Finally, each advertiser has a positive capacity determining the number of users she is
interested in targeting, and she gains a non-negative value from every one of the users assigned to
her (as long as her capacity is not exhausted). Thus, the advertiser’s utility is her value multiplied
by the number of users assigned to her (as long as this number does not exceed her capacity) minus
her total payment.
A mechanism for the above market knows the mediators and the advertisers, but has no knowl-
edge about their parameters or about the users. The objective of the mechanism is to find an
assignment of users to advertisers that maximizes the gain from trade. In addition, the mecha-
nism also decides how much to charge (pay) each advertiser (mediator). In order to achieve these
goals, the mechanism receives reports from the advertisers and mediators. Each advertiser reports
her capacity and value, and each mediator reports the number of his users and their costs. The
mediators and advertisers are strategic, and thus, free to send incorrect reports. In other words,
an advertiser may report incorrect capacity and value, and a mediator may report any subset of
his users and associate an arbitrary cost with each user. We say that an advertiser is truthful if
she reports correctly her capacity and value. A mediator is considered truthful if he reports to the
mechanism his true number of users and the true costs of these users. Notice that we assume that
the costs of the users are known to their corresponding mediators, i.e., the users are non-strategic.
This assumption is reasonable given the high speed of the online advertising market, especially
compared to the speed at which a private user can change her contract with her mediator.
To better understand the design challenge raised by this market, we observe that even if our
setting is reduced to a single buyer-single seller exchange, still it is well known from [11] that
maximizing gain from trade while maintaining individual rationality and incentive compatibility
perforce to run into deficit (is not budget balanced). A well known circumvention of [11]’s impos-
sibility is [10]’s trade reduction for the simple setting of double sided auctions. In [10]’s setting
trade is conducted between multiple strategic sellers offering identical goods to multiple strategic
buyers, where each seller is selling a single good and each buyer is interested in buying a single
good. The result of [10] relaxes the requirement for optimal trade by means of a trade reduction.
The trade reduction leads to an individually rational, incentive compatible and budget balance
mechanism. Following [10]’s work several other mechanisms were designed using the technique of
trade reduction. However, all the trade reduction mechanisms suggested in the literature to date
allow only players with single dimensional strategic spaces.
1.1 Our Contribution
Given that existing trade reduction solutions do not apply in our setting, we describe new double-
sided mechanisms able to handle mediators and advertisers with multi-dimensional strategic spaces.
Our mechanisms guarantee desirable economic properties, and at the same time yield a gain from
trade approximating the optimal gain from trade. If being truthful is a dominant strategy2 for
each advertiser and each mediator (regardless of other players’ strategies), then the mechanism is
incentive compatible (IC); if no advertiser and no mediator have a negative utility by participating
truthfully in the mechanism than it is individually rational (IR). Our objective is to construct
mechanisms that are IC and IR.
2Here and throughout the paper, a reference to domination of strategies should be understood as a reference to
weak domination. We never refer to strong domination.
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We first study a special case of our setting where the advertisers’ capacities are publicly known
(however, these capacities need not be all equal). The set of users of each mediator, on the other
hand, remains unknown to the mechanism (i.e., the mechanism only learns about it through the
mediator’s report). For this case we present a deterministic mechanism we term “Price by Removal
Mechanism” (PRM) that works as follows: for every mediator find a threshold cost, and remove
users of the mediator whose cost is above this threshold. Add a dummy advertiser with value that
is the maximum threshold cost computed for the mediators and a capacity that is equal to the
total number of users remaining. Assign the non-removed users to the advertisers using a VCG
auction [15, 6, 9] in which the users are the goods and the bidders are the advertisers. Price the
mediators according to their threshold cost, and price the advertisers according to the prices of the
VCG auction describe above.
The method used to calculate the threshold costs of the above mechanism induce its properties.
We prove that, for appropriately chosen threshold costs, the above mechanism is IC, IR, BB and
provides a non-trivial approximation for the optimal gain from trade. More formally, if τ is the
size of the optimal trade, and γ is an upper bound, known to the mechanism, on the maximum
capacity of any player (mediator or advertiser), then:
Theorem 1.1. PRM is BB, IR, IC and
(
1− 5γτ
)
-competitive.
PRM generalizes the trade reduction ideas used so far in the literature for single dimensional
strategic players, but is much more involved. Intuitively, PRM differs from previous ideas by the
following observation. A trading set is the smallest set of players that is required for trade to occur.
In the existing literature for single dimensional strategic players a trade reduction mechanism makes
a binary decision regarding every trading set of the optimal trade, i.e., either the trading set is
removed as a whole, or it is kept. On the other hand, dealing with multi-dimensional players
requires PRM to remove only parts of some trading sets, and thus, requires it to make non-binary
decisions.
Our deterministic mechanism PRM handles one type of multi-dimensional players (the mediators)
and one type of single dimensional strategic space players (the advertisers). In order to enrich our
strategic space even further, and allow advertisers to have multi-dimensional strategic spaces as
well, we present also a randomized mechanism termed “Threshold by Partition Mechanism” (TPM).
TPM applies to our general setting, i.e., we no longer assume that any capacity is known to the
mechanism, and it works as follows: divide the set of mediators uniformly at random into to two
sets (M1 and M2) and divide the set of advertiser uniformly at random, as well, into two sets (A1
and A2). Then use the optimal trade for M2 and A2 to produce threshold cost and threshold value
that allow BB pricing as well as the needed reduction in trade for M1 and A1. Analogously, use the
optimal trade for M1 and A1 to produce threshold cost and threshold value that allow BB pricing
as well as the needed reduction in trade for M2 and A2.
The above description of TPM is not complete since the use of threshold cost and value from
one pair (Mi, Ai) to reduce the trade in the other pair might create an unbalanced reduction. To
overcome this issue we create two random low priority sets: one of advertisers and the other of
mediators. Then, whenever the reduction in trade is unbalanced, we remove additional low priority
mediators or advertisers in order to restore balance (which can be done with high probability).
The following theorem shows that the above mechanism is IC, IR, BB and provides a non-trivial
approximation for the optimal gain from trade. The parameter α is an upper bound, known to the
mechanism, on the ratio between the maximum capacity of any player (mediator or advertiser) and
the size of the optimal trade.3
3The parameters γ and α both bound the maximum capacity of the players. Moreover, they are formally related
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Theorem 1.2. TPM is BB, IR, IC and (1− 28 3√α− 20e−2/ 3
√
α)-competitive.
We note that TPM is universally truthful, i.e., its IC property holds for every given choice of the
random coins of the mechanism.
One drawback of our results is that the competitive ratios guaranteed by Theorems 1.1 and 1.2
are non-trivial only when no single advertiser or mediator has a large market power and the mech-
anism has access to a good bound on the maximum market power of any player. From a practical
point of view we believe these assumption are both plausible. The number of agents using any
given real life ad-exchange is usually very large, and the mechanism can use the large quantity of
historical data available to it to estimate the bound it needs. From a more theoretical point of
view, the impossibility result of [11] shows that no non-trivial competitive ratio can be achieved
when one advertiser and one mediator control all the trade. This suggests, although we are unable
to prove it formally, that the competitive ratio must deteriorate as a single advertiser or mediator
gains more and more market power (i.e., when γ and α increase).
1.2 Related Work
From a motivational point of view the most closely related literature to our work consists of works
that involve mediators and online advertising markets, such as [1, 7, 14]. These works differ
from ours in two crucial points. First, despite being motivated by the online display ads network
exchange, the models studied by these works are actually auctions (i.e., one-sided mechanisms).
Thus, they need not deal with the challenges and impossibility integrated by the double-sided
structure of our market and the requirement to keep it from running into a deficit. Second, our
focus is maximization of the gain from trade, unlike the above works which focus on revenue
maximization.
Another related work involving both markets and mediators studies the phenomenon of markets
in which individual buyers and sellers trade through intermediaries, who determine prices via
strategic considerations [4]. An essential difference between the model of [4] and our model is that
[4] does not assume private values for the players, and therefore, the impossibility of [11] does not
apply in its model.
Last but not least is the literature on trade reduction and multi-sided markets. Deterministic
mechanisms using trade reduction as a mean to achieve IC, IR and BB were described for various
settings [10, 5, 2, 8, 12, 3]. Moreover, for a variant of the setting of [10, 3], [13] obtained a randomized
mechanism achieving IC, IR and strong budget balance (i.e., it is BB and leaves no surplus for
the market maker). The mutual grounds of all these settings is that all players participating in
the trade have a single dimension strategic space. This idea was captured by [8] which provided a
single trade reduction procedure applicable to all the above settings. In addition, [8] also defined
a class of problems that can be solved by its suggested trade reduction procedure. Essentially this
classification is based on partitioning the players participating in the trading set into equivalence
classes.
As pointed out in the previous subsection, both our presented mechanisms extend significantly
on the existing trade reduction literature. More specifically, even when all advertisers have known
equal capacities (while mediators can still have a variable number of users), fitting our model into
the classification of [8] still requires each mediator to have his own equivalence class (because a
mediator with many users can always replace a mediator with a few users within a trading set, but
by the formula α = γ/τ . We chose to formulate Theorems 1.1 and 1.2 in terms of the parameter that the mechanism
corresponding to each theorem assumes access to.
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the reverse is often not true). It follows that [8]’s trade reduction procedure might remove all the
trade, and thus, achieves only a trivial gain from trade approximation.
2 Notation and Basic Observations
We begin this section with a more formal presentation of our model. Our model consists of a set P
of users, a set M of mediators and a set A of advertisers. Each user p ∈ P has a non-negative cost
c(p) which she has to be paid if she is assigned to an advertiser. The users are partitioned among
the mediators, and we denote by P (m) ⊆ P the set of users associated with mediator m ∈ M
(i.e., the sets {P (m) | m ∈ M} form a disjoint partition of P ). The utility of a mediator m ∈ M
is the amount he is paid minus the total cost he has to forward to his assigned users; hence, if
x(p) ∈ {0, 1} is an indicator for the event that user p ∈ P (m) is assigned and t is the payment
received by m, then the utility of m is t −∑p∈P (m) x(p) · c(p). Finally, each advertiser a ∈ A has
a positive capacity u(a), and she gains a non-negative value v(a) from every one of the first u(a)
users assigned to her; thus, if advertiser a is assigned n ≤ u(a) users and has to pay t then her
utility is n · v(a) − t.
A mechanism for our model accepts reports from the advertisers and mediators, and based
on these reports outputs an assignment of users to advertisers. In addition, the mechanism also
decides how much to charge (pay) each advertiser (mediator). The objective of the mechanism is
to output an assignment of users to advertisers that maximizes the gain from trade.
For ease of the presentation, it is useful to associate a set B(a) of u(a) slots with each advertiser
a ∈ A. We then think of the users as assigned to slots instead of directly to advertisers. Formally,
let B be the set of all slots (i.e., B =
⋃
a∈AB(a)), then an assignment is a set S ⊆ B ×P in which
no user or slot appears in more than one ordered pair. We say that an assignment S assigns a user
p to slot b if (p, b) ∈ S. Similarly, we say that an assignment S assigns user p to advertiser a if
there exists a slot b ∈ B(a) such that (p, b) ∈ S. It is also useful to define values for the slots. For
every slot b of advertiser a, we define the value v(b) of b as equal to the value v(a) of a. Using this
notation, the gain from trade of an assignment S can be stated as
GfT(S) =
∑
(p,b)∈S
[v(b) − c(p)] .
In addition to the above notation, we would like to define two additional shorthands that we use
occasionally. Given a set A′ ⊆ A of advertisers, we denote by B(A′) = ⋃a∈A′ B(a) the set of slots
belonging to advertisers of A′. Similarly, given a set M ′ ⊆M of mediators, P (M ′) = ⋃m∈M ′ P (m)
is the set of users associated with mediators of M ′.
2.1 Comparison of Costs and Values
The presentation of our mechanisms is simpler when the values of slots and the costs of users are
all unique. Clearly, this is extremely unrealistic as all the slots of a given advertiser have the exact
same value in our model. Thus, we simulate uniqueness using a tie-breaking rule. The rule we
assume works as follows:
• The mechanism chooses an arbitrary order σ on the mediators and advertisers. It is impor-
tant that this order is chosen independently of the reports received by the mechanism. The
mechanism then uses this order to break ties when comparing users to slots and when com-
paring between users (slots) associated with different mediators (advertisers). For example,
when comparing the cost of user p with the value of a slot b, the mechanism breaks ties in
favor of p if and only if the mediator of p appears earlier than the advertiser of b in σ.
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• We assume that the report of every mediator induces some order on the set of users of this
mediators. The mechanism uses this order to break ties between the costs of users belonging
to the same mediator.
• Finally, since the slots of a given advertiser are all identical and non-strategic (recall that
slots were introduced into the model just for the purpose of simplifying the presentation),
any method can be used for tie-breaking between the slots of a given advertiser.
In the rest of this paper when costs/values are compared, unless it is explicitly specified that
they are compared as numbers, the comparison is assumed to use the above tie breaking rule. Note
that this assumption implies that two values (costs) are equal if and only if they belong to the
same slot (user). We now prove a useful observation that follows from the way we defined the
tie-breaking rule.
Observation 2.1. When the slots are ordered in an increasing (or decreasing) value order, all the
slots of a single advertiser are always consecutive.
Proof. Let b1 and b2 be two slots of one advertiser, and let b be an arbitrary slot of another
advertiser. It is enough to prove that v(b1) < v(b) implies v(b2) < v(b). The inequality v(b1) < v(b)
can happen in two cases. If v(b1) is smaller than v(b) as numbers, then we get v(b2) < v(b)
since v(b1) and v(b2) are equal as numbers. Otherwise, if v(b1) is equal to v(b) as numbers then
the inequality v(b1) < v(b) implies that the advertiser of b1 (and b2) appears later in σ than the
advertiser of b, and thus, we also have v(b2) < v(b).
2.2 Canonical Assignment
Given a set B′ ⊆ B of slots and a set P ′ ⊆ P of users, the canonical assignment Sc(P ′, B′) is the
assignment constructed by the following process. First, we order the slots of B′ in a decreasing
value order b1, b2, . . . , b|B′| and the users of P ′ in an increasing cost order p1, p2, . . . , p|P ′|. Then,
for every 1 ≤ i ≤ min{|B′|, |P ′|}, the canonical assignment Sc(B′, P ′) assigns user pi to slot bi if
and only if v(bi) > c(pi). The canonical assignment is an important tool used frequently by the
mechanisms we describe in the next sections. In some places we refer to the user or slot at location
i of a canonical solution Sc(P
′, B′). By using this expression we mean user pi or slot bi, respectively.
Additionally, the term |Sc(P,B)| is used very often in our proofs, and thus, it is useful to define
the shorthand τ = |Sc(P,B)|.
The following lemma shows that the above definition of τ is consistent with the use of τ in
Section 1.1 as the size of the optimal trade.
Lemma 2.2. The canonical assignment Sc(P
′, B′) maximizes GfT(Sc(P ′, B′)) among all the pos-
sible assignments of users of P ′ to slots of B′.
Proof. For every 0 ≤ i ≤ min{|B′|, |P ′|}, let Sic(P ′, B′) be the subset of Sc(P ′, B′) in which we keep
only the assignments of the first i users. More formally,
Sic(P
′, B′) = {(pj , bj) ∈ Sc(P ′, B′) | 1 ≤ j ≤ i} .
Let i∗ be the largest i such that Sic(P ′, B′) is contained in some assignment S∗ ⊆ P ′ × B′
maximizing GfT(S∗) among all the possible assignments of users of P ′ to slots of B′. Such an i∗
clearly exists since S0c (P
′, B′) = ∅ is a subset of every feasible assignment. There are two cases
to consider. The first case is when i∗ = min{|B′|, |P ′|}. In this case the canonical assignment
Sc(P
′, B′) is a subset of the optimal assignment S∗. Let us consider an arbitrary ordered pair
(pj , bk) ∈ S∗ \ Sc(P ′, B′), and let us assume, without loss of generality, that j ≤ k. Since S∗ is a
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legal assignment and (pj , bk) belongs to S
∗ together with all the ordered pairs of Sc(P ′, B′), the
ordered pair (pj , bj) cannot belong to Sc(P
′, B′). By definition, this implies c(pj) > v(bj), and thus,
c(pj) ≥ v(bj) even when we compare them as numbers. Thus,
v(bk)− c(pj) ≤ v(bj)− c(pj) ≤ 0 .
Summing the above inequality over all ordered pairs (pj, bk) ∈ S∗ \ Sc(P ′, B′), we get:
GfT(Sc(P
′, B′)) = GfT(S∗)−
∑
(pj ,bk)∈S∗\Sc(P ′,B′)
[v(bk)− c(pj)] ≥ GfT(S∗) ,
which completes the proof of the lemma for the case i∗ = min{|B′|, |P ′|}. The second case we need
to consider is the case 0 ≤ i∗ < min{|B′|, |P ′|}. In the rest of the proof we show that this case can
never happen, which implies the lemma.
Assume towards a contradiction 0 ≤ i∗ < min{|B′|, |P ′|}. Our objective is to show that there
exists an assignment S′ obeying Si
∗+1
c (P
′, B′) ⊆ S′ and GfT(S′) ≥ GfT(S∗), which is a contradiction
to the choice of i∗. By the choice of i∗ we have Si∗c (P ′, B′) ⊆ S∗, but Si
∗+1
c (P
′, B′) 6⊆ S∗, which
can only happen when (pi∗+1, bi∗+1) ∈ Si∗+1c (P ′, B′) \ S∗. There are now three cases that need to
be considered:
• If (pi∗+1, bi∗+1) can be added to S∗ without violating the feasibility, then we choose S′ =
S∗∪{(pi∗+1, bi∗+1)}. Clearly, Si∗+1c (P ′, B′) is a subset of S′ since Si
∗+1
c (P
′, B′) = Si∗c (P ′, B′)∪
{(pi∗+1, bi∗+1)} and Si∗c (P ′, B′) is a subset of S∗. Additionally, since (pi∗+1, bi∗+1) belongs to
the canonical assignment, we know that v(bi∗+1) > c(pi∗+1), and thus, v(bi∗+1) ≥ c(pi∗+1)
also when we compare them as numbers. Thus,
GfT(S′) = GfT(S∗) + [v(bi∗+1)− c(pi∗+1)] ≥ GfT(S∗) .
• When the previous case does not hold, there must be in S∗ either an ordered pair containing
pi∗+1 or an ordered pair containing bi∗+1. In the current case we assume that S
∗ contains an
ordered pair containing pi∗+1, but does not contain an ordered pair containing bi∗+1. The case
that S∗ contains both an ordered pair containing pi∗+1 and an ordered pair containing bi∗+1
is the next case we consider. Finally, the case that S∗ contains an ordered pair containing
bi∗+1, but does not contain an ordered pair containing pi∗+1 is analogous to the current case,
and is, thus, omitted.
Let (pi∗+1, b) be the ordered pair of S
∗ that contains pi∗+1. Since (pi∗+1, bi∗+1) appears
in the canonical solution, we must have c(pi∗+1) < v(bi∗+1), and thus, c(pi) < v(bi) for
every 1 ≤ i ≤ i∗. Hence, the assignment Si∗c (P ′, B′), which is contained in S∗, is equal to
{(pi, bi) | 1 ≤ i ≤ i∗}. This means that the slot b of the pair (pi∗+1, b) ∈ S∗ cannot be
one of the first i∗ slots, and thus, obeys v(b) ≤ v(bi∗+1). We now consider the assignment
S′ = S∗ ∪ {(pi∗+1, bi∗+1)} \ {(pi∗+1, b)}. Clearly this assignment contains Si∗+1c (P ′, B′) since
Si
∗+1
c (P
′, B′) = {(pi, bi) | 1 ≤ i ≤ i∗ + 1} and S∗ contains the assignment Si∗c (P ′, B′) =
{(pi, bi) | 1 ≤ i ≤ i∗}. Additionally,
GfT(S′) = GfT(S∗) + [v(bi∗+1)− c(pi∗+1)]− [v(b)− c(pi∗+1)]
= GfT(S∗) + [v(bi∗+1)− v(b)] ≥ GfT(S∗) .
• The last case we need to consider is when S∗ contains both an ordered pair (pi∗+1, b) containing
user pi∗+1 and an ordered pair (p, bi∗+1) containing slot bi∗+1. In this case we choose S
′ =
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S∗ ∪ {(pi∗+1, bi∗+1), (p, b)} \ {(pi∗+1, b), (p, bi∗+1)}. Since Si∗c (P ′, B′) ⊆ S∗ and Si
∗
c (P
′, B′)
cannot contain (by definition) either the ordered pair (p, bi∗+1) or the ordered pair (pi∗+1, b),
we get that S′ contains Si∗+1c (P ′, B′). Additionally,
GfT(S′) = GfT(S∗) + [v(bi∗+1)− c(pi∗+1)] + [v(b)− c(p)]
− [v(b) − c(pi∗+1)]− [v(bi∗+1)− c(p)] = GfT(S∗) .
3 Deterministic Mechanism
In this section we describe the deterministic mechanism “Price by Removal Mechanism” (PRM) for
our model. Recall that PRM assumes public knowledge of the advertisers’ capacities. Accordingly,
we assume throughout this section that the capacities of the advertisers are common knowledge (or
that the advertisers are not strategic about them). We also assume that PRM has access to a value
γ ≥ 1 such that:
u(a) ≤ γ ∀ a ∈ A and |P (m)| ≤ γ ∀ m ∈M .
In other words, γ is an upper bound on how large can be the capacity of an advertiser or the
number of users of a mediator. Informally, γ can be understood as a bound on the importance
every single advertiser or mediator can have.
A description of PRM is given as Mechanism 1. Notice that Mechanism 1 often refers to param-
eters of the model that are not known to the mechanism (i.e., values of advertiser, the number of
users of mediators and the costs of users). Whenever this happens, this should be understood as
referring to the reported values of these parameters.
Mechanism 1: Price by Removal Mechanism (PRM)
1. For every mediator m ∈ M , if the canonical assignment Sc(P \ P (m), B) is of size more than
4γ, denote by pm the user at location |Sc(P \ P (m), B)| − 4γ of the canonical assignment
Sc(P \ P (m), B), and let cm be the cost of pm. Otherwise, set cm to −∞.
2. For every mediator m ∈M , let Pˆ (m) be the set of users of mediator m whose cost is less than
cm. Intuitively, Pˆ (m) is the set of users of mediator m that the mechanism tries to assign to
advertisers.
3. Assign the users of
⋃
m∈M Pˆ (m) to the advertisers using a VCG auction. More specifically, the
users of
⋃
m∈M Pˆ (m) are the items sold in the auction, and the bidders are the advertisers of
A plus a dummy advertiser ad whose value and capacity are v(ad) = maxm∈M cm and u(ad) =∑
m∈M |Pˆ (m)|, respectively.
4. Charge every non-dummy advertiser by the same amount she is charged (as a bidder) by the
VCG auction.
5. For every user p assigned by the VCG auction, pay cm to the mediator m of p.
4
Remark: It can be shown that the existence of the dummy advertiser never affects the behavior
of Mechanism 1, and thus, one can safely omit it from the mechanism. Nevertheless, we keep this
advertiser in the above description of the mechanism since its existence simplifies our proof that
the mechanism is BB.
Let us recall our result regarding PRM.
Theorem 1.1. PRM is BB, IR, IC and
(
1− 5γτ
)
-competitive.
4Note that m is BB as he forwards to each of his assigned users her cost—which is less than cm.
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PRM improves over the trade reduction procedure of [8] by guarantying a non-trivial competitive
ratio even in the presence of players (mediators) with a multi-dimensional strategic space. However,
the competitive ratio guaranteed by PRM is slightly worse than the competitive ratio guaranteed by
the procedure of [8] when the players have single dimensional strategic spaces (which is 1 − 2/τ).
The next paragraph gives an intuitive explanation why it does not seem possible to improve the
competitive ratio of PRM to match the competitive ratio of 1− 2/τ guaranteed by [8]’s procedure.
Observe that PRM needs to maintain IC for both mediators and advertisers. In order to maintain
IC for the mediators the price for each mediator has to be computed while all his users are reduced
from the trade. This is why the real reduction in trade might be larger by up to γ compared to
the reduction 4γ explicitly stated by PRM, which explains the gap between the competitive ratio of
1 − 5γ/τ and the explicit reduction of 4γ in the mechanism. It remains to understand why the
explicit reduction is set to 4γ. The most significant difficulty in guaranteeing IC for the advertisers
is that an advertiser might change her report in order to affect the costs {cm}m∈M of the mediators,
and through them, manipulate the items offered in the VCG auction. PRM tackles this difficulty by
guaranteeing that advertisers performing such manipulations are assigned no users. Since the users
of mediator m are removed when cm is calculated, securing this guarantee requires that advertisers
having a slot in one of the last γ locations of the optimal trade are assigned no users. As an
advertiser might have up to γ slots, this translates into a requirement that an advertiser whose
earliest slot is in one of the last 2γ locations of the optimal trade is assigned no users. Moreover, to
simplify the proof our analysis in fact requires that an advertiser whose earliest slot is in one of the
last 3γ locations of the optimal trade is assigned no users. Taking into account, again, the fact that
the users of mediator m are removed when cm is calculated, guaranteeing the last property requires
a trade reduction of 4γ. To summarize, maintaining the advertisers’ IC imposes an explicit trade
reduction of 3γ that we present as 4γ for the sake of simplicity, and maintaining the mediators’
IC implies that the real trade reduction is larger by up to γ compared to the explicit one. Thus,
a competitive ratio of 1 − 4γτ seems to be inevitable in order to allow multi-dimensional strategic
spaces.
In the rest of this section we prove Theorem 1.1. We begin with some basic properties of PRM.
It is important to remember while reading the next proofs that the constructions of Sc(P,B) and
Sc(P \P (m), B) order the slots of B in the same order, and that the order of the users of P \P (m)
in the construction of Sc(P \ P (m), B) is obtained by removing the users of P (m) from the order
used by the construction of Sc(P,B).
Observation 3.1. For every mediator m ∈M , |Sc(P \ P (m), B)| ≤ τ .
Proof. Assume towards a contradiction that |Sc(P \ P (m), B)| > τ , and let b′τ+1 and p′τ+1 be
the slot and user at location τ + 1 of Sc(P \ P (m), B), respectively. Since p′τ+1 is assigned by
Sc(P \ P (m), B) to b′τ+1, it must be that v(b′τ+1) > c(p′τ+1).
On the other hand, let bτ+1 and pτ+1 be the slot and user at location τ + 1 of Sc(P,B),
respectively. Clearly bτ+1 and b
′
τ+1 are exactly the same slot. Moreover, p
′
τ+1 is either equal to
pτ+1 or appears in Sc(P,B) in a larger location than pτ+1. Hence,
v(bτ+1) = v(b
′
τ+1) > c(p
′
τ+1) ≥ c(pτ+1) ,
which is a contradiction since pτ+1 is not assigned to bτ+1 by Sc(P,B).
Using the last observation we can now prove the following lemma.
Lemma 3.2. For every mediator m ∈M the following is true:
• When cm 6= −∞, pm is assigned by the canonical assignment Sc(P,B).
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• All the users of Pˆm are assigned by Sc(P,B).
Proof. First, let us explain why the second claim we need to prove follows from the first one. If
cm = −∞, then Pˆm = ∅ and the second claim is trivial. Otherwise, the first claim states that pm
is assigned by the canonical assignment Sc(P,B). By the definition of a canonical assignment, all
the users having a lower cost than cm = c(pm) are assigned by Sc(P,B) as well. The second claim
now follows since Pˆm contains only users having a lower cost than cm.
It remains to prove the first claim. The claim is trivial when cm = −∞, thus, we assume
cm 6= −∞. Let F be the set of users that are assigned by Sc(P,B) but do not belong to P (m).
Clearly the users of F take locations 1 to |F | in Sc(P \P (m), B). On the other hand, we can lower
bound the size of F by τ − |P (m)| ≥ τ − γ. Thus, locations 1 to τ − γ of Sc(P \ P (m), B) are all
occupied by users assigned by Sc(P,B).
By Observation 3.1 and the fact that cm 6= −∞, pm is chosen by PRM as the user located at
location |Sc(P \ P (m), B)| − 4γ ≤ τ − 4γ of Sc(P \ P (m), B). This implies that pm is assigned by
Sc(P,B) since τ − 4γ ≤ τ − γ (and all the users at locations 1 to τ − γ of Sc(P \ P (m), B) are
assigned by Sc(P,B)).
Corollary 3.3. PRM is BB and assigns all the users of
⋃
m∈M Pˆm.
Proof. LetM ′ be the subset of mediators having a finite cm. Formally, M ′ = {m ∈M | cm 6= −∞}.
IfM ′ = ∅, then no users are assigned by PRM and Pˆm = ∅ for every mediator m ∈M , which makes
the corollary trivial. Hence, we assume from now on M ′ 6= ∅. We define now pτ as the user at
location τ in Sc(P,B). Clearly, c(pτ ) upper bounds the cost of any user assigned by Sc(P,M). On
the other hand, by Lemma 3.2, for every m ∈ M ′ the user pm is assigned by Sc(P,B). Hence,
c(pτ ) ≥ maxm∈M ′ c(pm) = maxm∈M ′ cm.
Let B′ be the set of slots assigned users by Sc(P,B), and let bτ be the slot at location τ in
Sc(P,B). Since pτ is assigned to bτ by Sc(P,B), we get: v(bτ ) > c(pτ ) ≥ maxm∈M ′ cm. Moreover,
v(bτ ) lower bounds the value of any slot in B
′, and thus, all the slots of B′ have values larger than
maxm∈M ′ cm. Combining this with the observation that |B′| = τ , we get that there exists a set
A′ ⊆ A of advertisers with the following properties:
• The advertisers of A′ all have values larger than maxm∈M ′ cm = maxm∈M cm, and thus,
larger than the value of the dummy advertiser ad, and larger than the cost of any user in⋃
m∈M ′ Pˆm =
⋃
m∈M Pˆm.
• The advertisers of A′ have a total capacity at least τ ≥ |⋃m∈M Pˆm|, where the inequality
holds since Lemma 3.2 guarantees that the users of
⋃
m∈M Pˆm are all assigned by Sc(P,M).
The two above properties imply together that the VCG auction (and thus, also PRM) assigns all
the users of
⋃
m∈M Pˆm to real advertisers. As no user is assigned to the dummy advertiser, and
the dummy advertiser has a value of maxm∈M cm, the VCG auction charges the real advertisers at
least maxm∈M cm for every user assigned to them. On the other hand, maxm∈M cm upper bounds
the payment a mediator receives from PRM for a single assigned user, and thus, PRM is budget
balanced.
3.1 The Competitive Ratio of PRM
In this section we analyze the competitive ratio of PRM, and show that it is at least 1 − 5γ/τ . If
5γ ≥ τ , then this is trivial. Thus, we assume throughout this section 5γ < τ .
Observation 3.4. Given a mediator m ∈ M , every user p 6∈ P (m) which is assigned by the
canonical assignment Sc(P,B) is also assigned by the canonical assignment Sc(P \ P (M), B).
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Proof. Let j′ and j be the locations of p in Sc(P \ P (m), B) and Sc(P,B), respectively. Clearly
j′ ≤ j, and thus, the slot at location j′ in Sc(P \ P (m), B) has a value larger or equal to the value
of the slot at location j in Sc(P,B). This means that p must be assigned by Sc(P \P (m), B) since
it is assigned by Sc(P,B).
Let us denote by ce the cost of the user at location τ −5γ of the canonical assignment Sc(P,B).
Using the last observation we get:
Lemma 3.5. For every mediator m ∈M , cm ≥ ce.
Proof. Let L be the set of the users at locations τ − 5γ to τ of Sc(P,B). Clearly all the users
of L have a cost equal or larger than ce. On the other hand, observe that by Observation 3.4 all
the users of L \ P (m) are assigned by Sc(P \ P (m), B). Hence, the number of users of L that are
assigned by Sc(P \ P (m), B) is at least:
|L \ P (m)| ≥ |L| − |P (m)| ≥ (5γ + 1)− γ = 4γ + 1 .
Recall that pm is selected as the user at location |Sc(P \ P (m), B)| − 4γ in Sc(P \ P (m), B).
This, together with the observation that Sc(P, \P (m), B) assigns at least 4γ+1 users of L, implies
that one of the following must be true: either pm is a user of L, or there exists a user of L that has
a smaller location in Sc(P, \P (m), B) than pm, and thus, has a lower cost than pm. In both cases
the lemma follows.5
Corollary 3.6. PRM is
(
1− 5γτ
)
-competitive.
Proof. Let P¯e be the set of users at locations 1 to τ − 5γ of the canonical assignment Sc(P,B).
Consider an arbitrary user p ∈ P¯e, and let m be her mediator. Lemma 3.5 and the definition of P¯e
imply together c(p) ≤ ce ≤ cm. On the other hand, cm = c(pm) is the cost of a user pm 6∈ P (m),
and thus, we cannot have c(p) = cm since the tie-breaking rule defined in Section 2.1 guarantees
that no two users have the same cost. Hence, c(p) < cm.
Recall that Pˆm is defined as the set of all users of P (m) whose cost is less than cm. Together
with the previous observation, this gives P¯e∩P (m) ⊆ Pˆm for every mediator m ∈M , and therefore,
P¯e ⊆
⋃
m∈M Pˆm. Notice now that Lemma 3.2 states that all the users of
⋃
m∈M Pˆm are assigned by
PRM. Hence, in particular, the users of the subset P¯e are all assigned by PRM.
Denote by S the assignment produced by PRM. Then:
GfT(S) =
∑
(p,b)∈S
[v(b)− c(p)] =
∑
(p,b)∈S
[v(b) −maxm∈M cm] +
∑
(p,b)∈S
[maxm∈M cm − c(p)] (1)
≥
∑
(p,b)∈S
[v(b)−maxm∈M cm] +
∑
p∈P¯e
[maxm∈M cm − c(p)] ,
where the inequality holds by the above discussion and the observation that every user assigned by
PRM belongs to ∪m∈M Pˆm, and thus, has a cost of at most maxm∈M cm.
The VCG auction assigns the users in a way that maximizes the total value of the advertisers
from the assigned users. This means that the |S| users assigned by S are assigned to the slots at
locations 1 to |S| of Sc(P,B). Let us denote this set of slots by BS . Additionally, let us denote by
B¯e the set of slots at locations 1 to |P¯e| in Sc(P,B). Then,
∑
(p,b)∈S
[v(b)−maxm∈M cm] =
∑
b∈BS
[v(b) −maxm∈M cm] ≥
∑
b∈B¯e
[v(b)−maxm∈M cm] ,
5In fact, it can be shown that the second case never happens.
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where the inequality holds due to two observations: first B¯e is a subset of BS since at least
|B¯e| = |P¯e| users are assigned by S. Second, the dummy advertiser ad has a value of maxm∈M cm,
and thus, every slot of BS has a value of at least maxm∈M cm since the VCG auction preferred
assigning a user to this slot over assigning it to ad.
Plugging the last inequality into Inequality (1) gives:
GfT(S) ≥
∑
b∈B¯e
[v(b)−maxm∈M cm] +
∑
p∈P¯e
[maxm∈M cm − c(p)] =
∑
b∈B¯e
v(b)−
∑
p∈P¯e
c(p)
≥ τ − 5γ
τ
·
∑
(p,b)∈Sc(P,B)
v(b)− τ − 5γ
τ
·
∑
(p,b)∈Sc(P,B)
c(p) =
τ − 5γ
τ
· GfT(Sc(P,B)) ,
where the second inequality holds since P¯e (B¯e) contains, by definition, the τ−5γ users (slots) with
the lowest costs (highest values) among the τ users (slots) assigned by the canonical assignment
Sc(P,B). The corollary now follows from the last inequality since Sc(P,B) is an assignment of
users from P to slots of B maximizing the gain from trade.
3.2 The Incentive Properties of PRM
In this section we prove the incentive parts of Theorem 1.1. We begin with a lemma analyzing the
incentive properties of PRM for mediators.
Lemma 3.7. For every mediator m, PRM is IR for m, and truthfulness is a dominant strategy for
him.
Proof. PRM calculates a threshold cm based on the reports of advertisers and mediators other than
m, and thus, cm is independent of the report of m. For every user p ∈ P (m), if p’s cost is larger
than cm, then p is not added to Pˆm, and thus, PRM does not assign p. On the other hand, if p’s cost
is smaller than cm, then p is added to Pˆm, and by Lemma 3.2 she is assigned by PRM to some slot
and m is paid cm.
From the above description it is clear that when m is truthful, he is paid for each assigned
user p ∈ P (m) at least the cost of the user. Thus, PRM is IR for m. To see why truthfulness is
a dominant strategy for m, notice that the utility function of m is maximized when all the users
of m whose cost is less than cm are assigned, and no other user of m is assigned; which is exactly
what PRM does when m is truthful.
Proving the incentive properties of PRM for the advertisers is more involved. We start by proving
that PRM is IR for advertisers.
Observation 3.8. For every advertiser a, PRM is IR for a.
Proof. PRM uses a VCG auction to assign users to advertisers, and to determine the cost each
advertiser has to pay. Since VCG auctions are IR, the payment charged for every advertiser is
upper bounded by the total value the advertiser gets from the users assigned to her.
In the rest of the section we concentrate proving that truthfulness is a dominant strategy for
the advertisers under PRM . Let us fix an advertiser a ∈ A. For technical reasons it is convenient to
somewhat enhance the strategy space of a. Clearly, if we can show that truthfulness is a dominant
strategy for a given the enhanced strategy space, then this is also true given the original strategy
space.
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Section 2.1 explains how ties between valuations of advertisers are broken using an order σ. In
particular, when comparing the values of slots of two different advertisers with identical values, the
values of the slots of the advertiser that appears earlier in σ are considered larger. We enhance
the strategy space of a by allowing her to report both her value and her location in σ compared to
the other advertisers and mediators. In other words, the relative order of the other advertisers and
mediators in the order σ defining the tie-breaking rule is fixed, and a can choose to insert herself
at any location within this order.
Given a possible strategy s for a, we denote by Bs the set of slots given that a uses this strategy,
and by ℓ(s) the lowest location in Sc(P,Bs) of a slot of a. Note that, since the slots of a appear
sequentially in Sc(P,Bs), they must appear at locations ℓ(s) to ℓ(s) + u(a)− 1 in Sc(P,Bs).
Observation 3.9. For every two indices 1 ≤ i ≤ j ≤ |B| − (γ − 1), if i+ (γ − 1) ≤ j, then there
exists a strategy s for advertiser a such that i ≤ ℓ(s) ≤ j.
Proof. ℓ(s) − 1 is equal to the total capacity of the advertisers appearing before the location set
by the strategy s for a in the order σ. Since the capacity of every advertiser is at most γ, the
values ℓ(s) corresponding to two adjacent possible locations for a in σ are different by at most γ.
Moreover, if a is inserted by s as the first advertiser in σ than ℓ(s) = 1, and if a is inserted by s
as the last advertiser in σ than ℓ(s) = |B| − (u(a) − 1) ≥ |B| − (γ − 1). Hence, for every list of
consecutive indices of length at least γ such that all the indices are between 1 and |B| − (γ − 1),
there must be a strategy s for a such that ℓ(s) is within this list.
The next claims analyze some possible strategies for a. Let s¯ be the strategy of a in which a
reports a value of ∞, and let τ¯ be the size of the canonical assignment Sc(P,Bs¯).
Observation 3.10. For every mediator m ∈M and strategy s for a, |Sc(P \ P (m), Bs)| ≤ τ¯ .
Proof. Assume towards a contradiction that |Sc(P \ P (m), Bs)| > τ¯ , and let pτ¯+1 and bτ¯+1 be
the user and slot, respectively, at location τ¯ + 1 in Sc(P \ P (m), Bs). By our assumption, pτ¯+1 is
assigned to bτ¯+1, and therefore, v(bτ¯+1) > c(pτ¯+1).
Let us now define p′τ¯+1 and b
′
τ¯+1 to be the user and slot, respectively, at location τ¯ + 1 in
Sc(P,Bs¯). Clearly, pτ¯+1 appears at a location greater or equal to τ¯ + 1 in Sc(P,Bs¯), hence,
c(pτ¯+1) ≥ c(p′τ¯+1). If b′τ¯+1 is a slot of a, then by definition v(b′τ¯+1) =∞ > v(bτ¯+1). Otherwise, the
location of b′τ¯+1 in Sc(P \ P (m), Bs) must be smaller or equal to τ¯ + 1 (its location in Sc(P,Bs¯)),
and thus, v(b′τ¯+1) ≥ v(bτ¯+1).
Combining all the inequalities we proved gives: v(b′τ¯+1) ≥ v(bτ¯+1) > c(pτ¯+1) ≥ c(p′τ¯+1), which
is a contradiction since b′τ¯+1 and p
′
τ¯+1 have the same location in Sc(P,Bs¯), but p
′
τ¯+1 is not assigned
to b′τ¯+1 by Sc(P,Bs¯).
Using the last observation we can now prove the following lemma, which considers strategies of
a with a relatively large ℓ(s).
Lemma 3.11. Given that advertiser a uses a strategy s such that ℓ(s) ≥ τ¯ − 3γ, PRM assigns no
users to a.
Proof. Let cτ¯−3γ be the cost of the user at location τ¯−3γ in Sc(P,Bs¯) if τ¯ > 3γ, and −∞ otherwise.
Our first objective is to show that cτ¯−3γ ≥ cm for every mediator m ∈ M . Consider an arbitrary
mediator m ∈ M . By Observation 3.10, |Sc(P \ P (m), Bs)| ≤ τ¯ . There are now two cases to
consider:
• If |Sc(P \ P (m), Bs)| ≤ 4γ, then cm = −∞ ≤ cτ¯−3γ .
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• If |Sc(P \P (m), Bs)| > 4γ, then cm is the cost of the user at location |Sc(P \P (m), Bs)|−4γ of
Sc(P \P (m), Bs). This user must appear in Sc(P,Bs¯) either at location (|Sc(P \P (m), Bs)|−
4γ)+γ ≤ τ¯−3γ or at a smaller location. On the other hand, since τ¯ ≥ |Sc(P \P (m), Bs)| > 4γ,
cτ¯−3γ is the cost of the user at location τ¯ − 3γ of Sc(P,Bs¯), and thus, cτ¯−3γ ≥ cm.
The fact that cτ¯−3γ ≥ maxm∈M cm implies that
⋃
m∈M Pˆm contains only users whose cost is
smaller than cτ¯−3γ , and there are only τ¯ − 3γ − 1 such users. The VCG auction of PRM assigns the
users of
⋃
m∈M Pˆm to the slots of Bs at the lowest locations, and thus, only slots at locations 1 to
τ¯ − 3γ − 1 have a potential to be assigned a user. Since we assume ℓ(s) ≥ τ − 3γ, no slot of a is
among these slots, and thus, a is assigned no users by PRM.
The following lemma considers strategies of a with a relatively small ℓ(s).
Lemma 3.12. Given a strategy s for advertiser a such that ℓ(s) ≤ τ¯ − 2γ and a mediator m ∈M ,
|Sc(P \ P (m), Bs)| = |Sc(P \ P (m), Bs¯)|.
Proof. The order of the users is identical in both Sc(P \ P (m), Bs) and Sc(P \ P (m), Bs¯). On the
other hand, notice that ℓ(s) must be at least 1, and thus, τ¯ ≥ 2γ + 1 by the assumption ℓ(s) ≤
τ¯ − 2γ. Moreover, this assumption implies that all the slots of a appear at locations between 1 and
max{ℓ(s)+γ−1, γ} ≤ max{τ¯−γ−1, γ} = τ¯−γ−1 in both Sc(P \P (m), Bs) and Sc(P \P (m), Bs¯).
Hence, the sequences of the slots appearing in Sc(P \P (m), Bs) and Sc(P \P (m), Bs¯) starting from
location τ¯ − γ are identical. This implies that for every τ¯ − γ ≤ i ≤ min{|P \ P (m)|, |B|},
Sc(P \P (m), Bs) assigns its user at location i to its slot at location i if and only if Sc(P \P (m), Bs¯)
assigns its user at location i to its slot at location i.
The above discussion implies that |Sc(P \ P (m), Bs)| = |Sc(P \ P (m), Bs¯)| whenever it holds
that:
|Sc(P \ P (m), Bs¯)| ≥ τ¯ − γ . (2)
Thus, the rest of the proof concentrate on proving Inequality (2). Let pτ¯ and sτ¯ be the user
and slot at location τ¯ of Sc(P,Bs¯). Since τ¯ = |Sc(P,Bs¯)| by definition, pτ¯ is assigned to sτ¯ by
Sc(P,Bs¯), and thus, v(sτ¯ ) > c(pτ¯ ). Next, let p
′¯
τ−γ and s′¯τ−γ be the user and slot at location τ¯−γ of
Sc(P \ P (m), Bs¯). Clearly, p′¯τ−γ appears either at location τ¯ or at a smaller location in Sc(P,Bs¯),
and thus, c(p′¯τ−γ) ≤ c(pτ¯ ). Moreover, s′¯τ−γ appears at location τ¯ − γ also in Sc(P,Bs¯), and thus,
v(s′¯τ−γ) > v(sτ¯ ). Combining all the above inequalities gives:
v(s′τ¯−γ) > v(sτ¯ ) > c(pτ¯ ) ≥ c(p′τ¯−γ) .
Hence, p′¯τ−γ is assigned to s′¯τ−γ by the canonical assignment Sc(P \ P (m), Bs¯), which implies
Inequality (2).
Corollary 3.13. For every mediator m ∈ M , cm is identical given that advertiser a uses any
strategy s obeying ℓ(s) ≤ τ¯ − 2γ.
Proof. Consider two strategies s1 and s2 for a such that ℓ(s1), ℓ(s2) ≤ τ¯ − 2γ. Given that a
uses strategy s1, PRM selects cm as the cost of the user at location |Sc(P \ P (m), Bs1)| − 4γ in
Sc(P \ P (m), Bs1) or −∞ if |Sc(P \ P (m), Bs1)| ≤ 4γ. Similarly, given that that a uses strategy
s2, PRM selects cm as the cost of the user at location |Sc(P \ P (m), Bs2)| − 4γ in Sc(P \ P (m), Bs2)
or −∞ if |Sc(P \ P (m), Bs2)| ≤ 4γ. We claim that in both cases the same cm is produced by PRM.
To see why this is the case observe that the two canonical assignments Sc(P \ P (m), Bs1) and
Sc(P \ P (m), Bs2) share the order of the users, i.e., at a given location they both have the same
user. Moreover, by Lemma 3.12:
|Sc(P \ P (m), Bs1)| = |Sc(P \ P (m), Bs¯)| = |Sc(P \ P (m), Bs2)| .
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We are now ready to prove that truthfulness is a dominant strategy for a.
Lemma 3.14. Given PRM, truthfulness is a dominant strategy for advertiser a.
Proof. If τ¯ ≤ 3γ, then, by Lemma 3.11, PRM does not assign any users regardless of the strategy
used by a, and thus, any strategy is a dominant strategy for a. Hence, we may assume τ¯ > 3γ for
the remaining part of the proof. Let st be the truthful strategy of a, and let sˆ be any strategy such
that τ¯ − 3γ ≤ ℓ(sˆ) ≤ τ¯ − 2γ (such a strategy exists by Observation 3.9). There are now two cases
to consider, depending on the relationship between ℓ(st) and ℓ(sˆ).
Consider first the case ℓ(st) ≤ ℓ(sˆ) ≤ τ¯ − 2γ. By Corollary 3.13, every strategy s for a having
ℓ(s) ≤ τ¯−2γ results in the same values cm for all mediators, and thus, PRM ends up using exactly the
same VCG auction for all these strategies (up to the bid of the bidder corresponding to a). Since
VCG auctions are incentive compatible, this means that reporting the truth is a best response for a
among all the possible strategies s for a obeying ℓ(s) ≤ τ¯ − 2γ. Moreover, truthfulness guarantees
a non-negative utility for a since PRM is advertiser-side IR by Observation 3.8. Thus, being truthful
dominates also strategies s for a having ℓ(s) ≥ τ¯ − 2γ ≥ τ¯ − 3γ since such strategies result in 0
utility for a by Lemma 3.11.
Consider now the case ℓ(st) > ℓ(sˆ) ≥ τ¯ − 3γ. By Lemma 3.11 a is assigned no users (and thus,
gets 0 utility) when she uses her truthful strategy st. Let us observe what happens if advertiser a
is modified so that her new truthful strategy is sˆ. By Lemma 3.11 the modified a also gets 0 utility
when using her truthful strategy sˆ. On the other hand, the value of the modified advertiser for
each user is at least as high as the value of the original advertiser, and thus, the modified advertiser
gets at least as high utility as the original advertiser for every given outcome. Hence, to show
that no strategy can give the original advertiser a positive utility, it is enough to show that the
strategy maximizing the utility of the modified advertiser is her truthful strategy sˆ; which follows
immediately from the first case (since the truthful strategy for the modified advertiser is sˆ, and sˆ
obeys ℓ(sˆ) ≤ τ¯ − 2γ).
Corollary 3.15. Given PRM, truthfulness is a dominant strategy for every advertiser.
Proof. Follows from Lemma 3.14 since a is just an arbitrary fixed advertiser.
4 Randomized Mechanism
In this section we describe the randomized mechanism “Threshold by Partition Mechanism” (TPM)
for our model. Unlike the mechanism PRM from Section 3, TPM need not assume public knowledge
about the advertisers’ capacities, i.e., the advertisers now have multi-dimensional strategy spaces.
On the other hand, TPM assumes access to a value α ∈ [|Sc(P,B)|−1, 1] such that we are guaranteed
that:
u(a)
|Sc(P,B)| ≤ α ∀ a ∈ A and
|P (m)|
|Sc(P,B)| ≤ α ∀ m ∈M .
In other words, α is an upper bound on how large can be the capacity of an advertiser or the number
of users of a mediator compared to the size of the optimal assignment Sc(P,B). We remind the
reader that α is related to the value γ from Section 3 by the equation α = γ/τ , and thus, α, like γ,
can be informally understood as a bound on the importance of every single advertiser or mediator.
It is important to note that α is well-defined only when |Sc(P,B)| > 0, and thus, we assume this
inequality is true throughout the rest of the section.
A description of TPM is given as Mechanism 2. Notice that Mechanism 2 often refers to param-
eters of the model that are not known to the mechanism, such as the value of an advertiser or the
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number of users of a mediator. Whenever this happens, this should be understood as referring to
the reported values of these parameters.
Mechanism 2: Threshold by Partition Mechanism (TPM)
1. Let ML be a set of mediators containing each mediator m ∈M with probability min{17 3
√
α, 1},
independently. Similarly, AL is a set of advertisers containing each advertiser a ∈ A with
probability min{17 3√α, 1}, independently. Intuitively, the subscript L in ML and AL stands for
“low priority”.
2. Let σA be an arbitrary order over the advertisers that places the advertisers of AL after all the
other advertisers and is independent of the reports received by the mechanism. Similarly, σM
is an arbitrary order over the mediators that places the mediators of ML after all the other
mediators and is independent of the reports received by the mechanism.
3. Partition the mediators of M into two sets M1 and M2 by adding each mediator m ∈ M with
probability 1/2, independently, toM1 and otherwise toM2. Similarly, partition the advertisers of
A into two sets A1 and A2 by adding each advertiser a ∈ A with probability 1/2, independently,
to A1 and otherwise to A2. The rest of the algorithm explains how to assign users of mediators
from M1 to slots of advertisers from A1, and how to charge advertisers of A1 and pay mediators
of M1. Analogous steps, which we omit, should be added for handling the advertisers of A2 and
the mediators of M2.
4. Let pˆ and bˆ be the user and slot at location ⌈(1 − 4 3√α) · |Sc(P (M2), B(A2))|⌉ of the canonical
solution Sc(P (M2), B(A2)). If (1− 4 3
√
α) · |Sc(P (M2), B(A2))| ≤ 0, then the previous definition
of pˆ and bˆ cannot be used. Instead define pˆ as a dummy user of cost −∞ and bˆ as a dummy
slot of value ∞. Using pˆ and bˆ define now two sets
Pˆ = {p ∈ P (M1) | c(p) < c(pˆ)} and Bˆ = {b ∈ B(A1) | v(b) > v(bˆ)} .
It is important to note that Pˆ and Bˆ are empty whenever pˆ and bˆ are dummy user and slot,
respectively.
5. While there are unassigned users in Pˆ and unassigned slots in Bˆ do the following:
• Let m be the earliest mediator in σM having unassigned users in Pˆ .
• Let a be the earliest advertiser in σA having unassigned slots in Bˆ.
• Assign the unassigned user of Pˆ ∩P (m) with the lowest cost to an arbitrary unassigned slot of
Bˆ∩B(a), charge a payment of v(bˆ) to advertiser a and transfer a payment of c(pˆ) to mediator
m.6
Let us recall our result regarding TPM.
Theorem 1.2. TPM is BB, IR, IC and (1− 28 3√α− 20e−2/ 3
√
α)-competitive.
Intuitively, the analysis of TPM works by exploiting concentration results showing that the
canonical assignments Sc(P (M1), B(A1)) and Sc(P (M2), B(A2)) are not very different from each
other. This similarity allows us to use information from Sc(P (M2), B(A2)) to set the payments
charged to advertisers of B(A1) and payed to mediators of P (M1), and vice versa, while keeping
a reasonable competitive ratio. The advantage of setting the payments this way is that it reduces
the control players have on the payments they have to pay or are paid, which helps the mechanism
to be IC.
In the rest of this section we prove Theorem 1.2. We start with the following observation.
6Note that m is paid c(pˆ) for the assignment of each one of his users. Hence, m is always BB since the membership
of p in Pˆ implies c(p) < c(pˆ) (and c(p) ≤ c(pˆ) when the costs are compared as numbers).
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Observation 4.1. TPM is BB.
Proof. We show that whenever TPM assigns a user p to a slot b, it charges the advertiser of b
more than it pays the mediator of p. Consider an arbitrary ordered pair (p, b) from the assignment
produced by TPM. We assume without loss of generality that p ∈ P (M1); the other case is symmetric.
The fact that p is assigned implies p ∈ Pˆ , hence, Pˆ is non-empty. Similarly, the fact that a user is
assigned to b implies that Bˆ is not empty.
Recall that the fact that Pˆ and Bˆ are not empty implies that pˆ and bˆ are not dummy
user and slot, respectively. This means that pˆ and bˆ are matched by the canonical assignment
Sc(P (M2), B(A2)). Since a canonical assignment never assigns a user p
′ to a slot b′ when c(p′) >
v(b′), we get c(pˆ) < v(bˆ). The proof now completes by observing that the advertiser of b is charged
v(bˆ) for the assignment of p to b, while the mediator of p is paid c(pˆ) for this assignment.
4.1 The Incentive Properties of TPM
In this section we prove the incentive parts of Theorem 1.2. Specifically, we prove that TPM is IR
and IC.
Lemma 4.2. For every mediator m (advertiser a), TPM is IR for m (a), and truthfulness is a
dominant strategy for him (her).
Proof. We prove the lemma only for mediators. The proof for advertisers is analogous (with
slots exchanging roles with users, v(bˆ) exchanging roles with c(pˆ), etc.), and thus, we omit it.
Additionally, we assume without loss of generality that m ∈M1 (the other case is symmetric).
Recall that TPM calculates a set Pˆ of users, and each user p′ ∈ P (M1) belongs to Pˆ if and only
if her cost is lower than some threshold c(pˆ). Additionally, note that TPM calculates the threshold
c(pˆ) based on the reports of advertisers and mediators in A2 and M2, respectively. Thus, m, which
belongs to M1, cannot affect this threshold. Similarly, m cannot affect the set of slots Bˆ.
Whenever a user p ∈ P (m) is assigned to a slot the utility of m decreases by c(p) and increases
by the payment m gets, which is c(pˆ). In other words, the utility of m changes by c(pˆ)−c(p). When
m is truthful this change is always non-negative since p can be assigned only when she belongs to
Pˆ , which implies that the cost of p is smaller than pˆ. This already proves that the utility of m is
non-negative when he is truthful, and thus, TPM is IR for m.
We claim that there exists a value k which is independent of the report of m such that for any
report of m the mechanism assigns the min{k, |Pˆ ∩ P (m)|} users of m with the lowest reported
costs. Before proving this claim, let us explain why the lemma follows from this claim. The above
description shows that the utility of m changes by a c(pˆ)− c(p) for every assigned user p ∈ P (m),
thus, m wishes to assign as many as possible users having cost less than c(pˆ), and if he cannot
assign all of them then he prefers to assign the users with the lowest costs. By reporting truthfully
m guarantees that only users of cost less than c(pˆ) get to Pˆ , and thus, has a chance to be assigned.
Moreover, by the above claim the mechanism assigns the k users of Pˆ ∩P (m) with the lowest costs
(or all of them if |Pˆ ∩ P (m)| < k). Hence, the above claim indeed implies that truthfulness is a
dominant strategy for m.
We are only left to prove the above claim. One can view TPM as considering the mediators
according to the order σM . For every mediator of m
′ ∈ M1 TPM assigns the users of Pˆ ∩ P (m′)
one by one (in an increasing reported costs order). Every assignment of a user “consumes” one
unassigned slot of Bˆ, and the assignment of users stops when all the users of Pˆ are assigned, or
there are no more unassigned slots in Bˆ. This means that if TPM assigns users to all the slots of
Bˆ before considering m, then no user of m is assigned. The claim is true in this case with k = 0.
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Otherwise, we choose k to be the number of unassigned Bˆ slots immediately before TPM considers
m. Notice that the report of m does not affect the behavior of TPM up to the point it considers m,
and thus, k is independent of the report of m. If there are more than k users in Pˆ ∩ P (m), then
only the k of them with the lowest costs are assigned before TPM consumes all the unassigned slots
of Bˆ and stops. Otherwise, if |Pˆ ∩P (m)| ≤ k then TPM manages to assigns all the users of Pˆ ∩P (m)
before it runs out of unassigned slots of Bˆ.
4.2 The Competitive Ratio of TPM
In this section we analyze the competitive ratio of TPM. Let us define P˜ (B˜) as the set of the users
(slots) at locations 1 to ⌈(1− 11 3√α)τ⌉ of the canonical assignment Sc(P,B) (P˜ and B˜ are defined
as the empty set when 1− 11 3√α ≤ 0). The following observation shows that most of the gain from
trade of the canonical assignment Sc(P,B) comes from the users and slots of P˜ and B˜, respectively.
For convenience, let us denote by Po the set of users that are assigned by Sc(P,B), and by Bo the
set of slots that are assigned some user by Sc(P,B).
Observation 4.3.
∑
b∈B˜ v(b)−
∑
p∈P˜ c(p) ≥ (1− 11 3
√
α) · GfT(Sc(P,B)).
Proof. If 1 − 11 3√α ≤ 0, then both B˜ and P˜ are empty, and the inequality that we need to prove
holds since its left hand side is 0 and its right hand side is non-positive (recall that Sc(P,B) is
an assignment of users from P to slots of B maximizing the gain from trade, and thus, its gain
from trade is at least 0 since GfT(∅) = 0). Thus, we may assume in the rest of the proof that
1− 11 3√α > 0.
Since B˜ contains the ⌈(1− 11 3√α)τ⌉ slots with the largest values among the slots of Bo, we get:
∑
b∈B˜
v(b) ≥ ⌈(1 − 11 3√α)τ⌉ ·
∑
b∈Bo v(b)
τ
.
Similarly, since P˜ contains the ⌈(1 − 11 3√α)τ⌉ users with the lowest costs among the users of Po,
we get: ∑
p∈A˜
c(p) ≤ ⌈(1 − 11 3√α)τ⌉ ·
∑
c∈Po c(p)
τ
.
Combining the two inequities gives:
∑
b∈B˜
v(b) −
∑
p∈P˜
c(p) ≥ ⌈(1− 11 3√α)τ⌉ ·
(∑
b∈Bo v(b) −
∑
p∈Po c(p)
)
τ
= ⌈(1− 11 3√α)τ⌉ · GfT(Sc(P,B))
τ
≥ (1− 11 3√α) · GfT(Sc(P,B)) .
Observation 4.3 shows that one can prove a competitive ratio for TPM by relating the gain from
trade of the assignment it produces to the gain from trade obtained by assigning the users of P˜ to
the slots B˜. The following lemma is a key lemma we use to relate the two gains.
Lemma 4.4. There exists an event E1 of probability at least 1− 10e−2/ 3
√
α such that E1 implies the
following:
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(i) B˜ ∩B(A1) ⊆ Bˆ (iii) |Pˆ \ P (ML)| ≤ |Bˆ|
(ii) P˜ ∩ P (M1) ⊆ Pˆ (iv) |Bˆ \B(AL)| ≤ |Pˆ |
(v) c(p) ≤ ℓ(P,B) ≤ v(b) for every user p ∈ Pˆ and slot b ∈ Bˆ, where
ℓ(P,B) is a value which is independent of the random coins of TPM
and obeys c(p) ≤ ℓ(P,B) ≤ v(b) for every p ∈ Po and b ∈ Bo.
Before proving Lemma 4.4, let us explain how the competitive ratio of TPM follows from it. Let
Sˆ be the assignment produced by TPM.
Lemma 4.5. There exists an event E of probability at least 1− 20e−2/ 3
√
α such that E implies:
GfT(Sˆ) ≥
∑
b∈B˜\B(AL)
[v(b) − ℓ(P,B)] +
∑
p∈P˜\P (ML)
[ℓ(P,B)− c(p)] .
Proof. Assume first that the event E1 holds. Lemma 4.4 shows that given E1 we have |Pˆ \P (ML)| ≤
|Bˆ|, hence, TPM assigns at least |Pˆ \ P (ML)| users. Additionally, since TPM assigns all the users of
Pˆ \ P (ML) before it starts assigning users of Pˆ ∩ P (ML), we get that all the users of Pˆ \ P (ML)
are assigned by Sˆ given E1. On the other hand, Lemma 4.4 also shows that given E1 all the users of
P˜ ∩P (M1) belong to Pˆ , and thus, the users of (P˜ ∩P (M1))\P (ML) are all assigned by Sˆ. A similar
argument shows that the slots of (B˜∩B(A1))\B(AL) are all assigned users by Sˆ given E1. Finally,
observe that E1 also implies that c(p) ≤ ℓ(P,B) ≤ v(b) for every pair (p, b) ∈ Sˆ ∩ (P (M1)×B(A1)).
TPM assigns users of P (M2) to slots of B(A2) in an analogous way to the assignment of users of
P (M1) to slots of B(A1). Thus, by symmetry, there must exist an event E2 of probability at least
1− 10e−2/ 3
√
α (the probability of E1) that guarantees the following three things.
• The users of (P˜ ∩ P (M2)) \ P (ML) are all assigned by Sˆ.
• The slots of (B˜ ∩B(A2)) \B(AL) are all assigned users by Sˆ.
• c(p) ≤ ℓ(P,B) ≤ v(b) for every pair (p, b) ∈ Sˆ ∩ (P (M2)×B(A2)).
Let us now define E as the event that both E1 and E2 happen together. By the union bound
the probability of E is at least 1 − 20e−2/ 3
√
α as promised. Additionally, combining the properties
that follow from E1 and E2 by the above discussion, we get that E implies the following properties.
• The users of P˜ \ P (ML) are all assigned by Sˆ.
• The slots of B˜ \B(AL) are all assigned users by Sˆ.
• c(p) ≤ ℓ(P,B) ≤ v(b) for every pair (p, b) ∈ Sˆ.
The last property holds since TPM assigns users of P (M1) (P (M2)) only to slots of B(A1) (B(A2)),
and thus, (Sˆ ∩ (P (M2)×B(A2))) ∪ (Sˆ ∩ (P (M2)×B(A2))) = Sˆ.
In the rest of the proof we assume that E happens. Consider an ordered pair (p, b) ∈ Sˆ. The
contribution of (p, b) to GfT(Sˆ) is:
v(b)− c(p) = [v(b) − ℓ(P,B)] + [ℓ(P,B)− c(p)] .
Notice that the two terms that appear in brackets on the right hand side of the last equation are
both positive given E . This allows us to lower bound the gain from trade of Sˆ as follows:
GfT(Sˆ) =
∑
(p,b)∈Sˆ
[v(b) − c(p)] =
∑
(p,b)∈Sˆ
{[v(b) − ℓ(P,B)] + [ℓ(P,B)− c(p)]}
≥
∑
b∈B˜\B(AL)
[v(b) − ℓ(P,B)] +
∑
p∈P˜\P (ML)
[ℓ(P,B)− c(p)] .
Corollary 4.6. TPM is at least (1− 28 3√α− 20e−2/ 3
√
α)-competitive.
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Proof. The corollary is trivial when 28 3
√
α+20e−2/ 3
√
α > 1. Thus, we assume in this proof 28 3
√
α+
20e−2/ 3
√
α ≤ 1. Let Val(ML, AL) denote the expression:
∑
b∈B˜\B(AL)
[v(b) − ℓ(P,B)] +
∑
p∈P˜\P (ML)
[ℓ(P,B)− c(p)] .
Since every slot belongs to B(AL) with probability 17 3
√
α and every user belongs to P (ML) with
the same probability, we get:
E[Val(ML, AL)] = (1− 17 3
√
α) ·
∑
b∈B˜
[v(b) − ℓ(P,B)] + (1 − 17 3√α) ·
∑
p∈P˜
[ℓ(P,B)− c(b)]
= (1− 17 3√α) · Val(∅,∅) .
Additionally, the definition of ℓ(P,B) guarantees that v(b)− ℓ(P,B) ≥ 0 and ℓ(P,B)− c(p) ≥ 0 for
every b ∈ B˜ ⊆ Bo and p ∈ P˜ ⊆ Po. Thus, Val(ML, AL) ≤ Val(∅,∅) for every two sets ML ⊆ M
and AL ⊆ A. Using Lemma 4.5 and the observation that TPM always produces assignments of
non-negative gain from trade, we now get:
E[GfT(Sˆ)] = Pr[E ] · E[GfT(Sˆ) | E ] + Pr[¬E ] · E[GfT(Sˆ) | ¬E ]
≥ Pr[E ] · E[Val(ML, AL) | E ] = E[Val(ML, AL)]− Pr[¬E ] · E[Val(ML, AL) | ¬E ]
≥ (1− 17 3√α) · Val(∅,∅)− Pr[¬E ] · Val(∅,∅) = (1− 17 3√α− Pr[¬E ]) · Val(∅,∅) . (3)
Recall that Pr[¬E ] ≤ 20e−2/ 3
√
α by Lemma 4.5. Additionally, Observation 4.3 and the fact that
|P˜ | = |B˜| by definition imply together:
Val(∅,∅) =
∑
b∈B˜
[v(b) − ℓ(P,B)] +
∑
p∈P˜
[ℓ(P,B)− c(p)]
=
∑
b∈B˜
v(b)−
∑
p∈P˜
c(p) ≥ (1− 11 3√α) · GfT(Sc(P,A)) .
Plugging the last observations into Inequality 3 gives:
E[GfT(Sˆ)] ≥ (1− 17 3√α− Pr[¬E ]) · Val(∅,∅)
≥ (1− 17 3√α− 20e−2/ 3
√
α) · (1− 11 3√α) · GfT(Sc(P,A))
≥ (1− 28 3√α− 20e−2/ 3
√
α) · GfT(Sc(P,B)) .
The corollary now follows by recalling that Sc(P,B) is the assignment of users from P to slots of
B which maximizes the gain from trade.
It remains now to prove Lemma 4.4. Let us begin with the following technical lemma.
Lemma 4.7. Given a subset B′ ⊆ Bo and a probability q ∈ [0, 1], let B′[q] be a random subset of
B′ constructed as follows: for every advertiser a ∈ A, independently, with probability q the slots of
advertiser a that belong to B′ appear also in B′[q]. Then, for every β ∈ (0, 1]:
Pr[||B′[q]| − q · |B′|| ≥ βτ ] ≤ 2e−2β2/α .
Similarly, given a subset P ′ ⊆ Po and a probability q ∈ [0, 1], let P ′[q] be a random subset of P ′
constructed as follows: for every mediator m ∈ M , independently, with probability q the users of
mediator m that belong to P ′ appear also in P ′[q]. Then, for every β ∈ (0, 1]:
Pr[||P ′[q]| − q · |P ′|| ≥ βτ ] ≤ 2e−2β2/α .
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Proof. We prove the first inequality; the second inequality is analogous. First, observe that the
lemma is trivial when B′ = ∅ since B′ = ∅ implies ||B′[q]| − q · |B′|| = 0 < βτ . Thus, we may
assume in the rest of the proof B′ 6= ∅. For every advertiser a ∈ A, let Xa be an indicator for the
event that slots of a appear in B′[q]. Then:
|B′[q]| =
∑
a∈A
Xa · |B′ ∩B(a)| .
The definition of α implies |B(a)| ≤ ατ for every advertiser a ∈ A, and thus, 0 ≤ |B′ ∩B(a)| ≤ ατ .
Hence, by Hoeffding’s inequality:
Pr[||B′[q]| − q · |B′|| ≥ βτ ] = Pr[||B′[q]| − E[|B′[q]|]| ≥ βτ ] ≤ 2e−
2(βτ)2
∑
a∈A |B
′∩B(a)|2
≤ 2e−
2(βτ)2
ατ ·
∑
a∈A |B
′∩B(a)| = 2e
− 2β2τ
α·|B′| ≤ 2e−
2β2τ
α·|Bo| = 2e−
2β2
α .
Let E ′ be the event that the following inequalities are all true (at the same time):
(i) ||Bo ∩B(A2)| − |Bo|/2| ≤ 3
√
α · τ (iii) ||B˜ ∩B(A2)| − |B˜|/2| ≤ 3
√
α · τ
(ii) ||Po ∩ P (M2)| − |Po|/2| ≤ 3
√
α · τ (iv) ||P˜ ∩ P (M2)| − |P˜ |/2| ≤ 3
√
α · τ
Observation 4.8. Pr[E ′] ≥ 1− 8e−2/ 3
√
α.
Proof. Observe that Bo∩B(A2), B˜∩B(A2), Po∩P (M2) and P˜ ∩P (M2) have the same distributions
as Bo[1/2], B˜[1/2], Po[1/2] and P˜ [1/2], respectively. Moreover, by definition B˜ ⊆ Bo and P˜ ⊆ Po.
Hence, by Lemma 4.7, each one of the four inequalities defining E ′ holds with probability at least
1− 2e−2/ 3
√
α. The observation now follows by the union bound.
Next, we need the following useful observation.
Observation 4.9. It always holds that:
min{|Po ∩ P (M2)|, |Bo ∩B(A2)|} ≤ |Sc(P (M2), B(A2))| ≤ max{|Po ∩ P (M2)|, |Bo ∩B(A2)|} .
Proof. Let pτ and bτ be the user and slot at location τ of Sc(P,B), respectively. The definition
of a canonical assignment guarantees c(pτ ) < v(bτ ). Additionally, the slots of Bo all appear in
locations 1 to τ of Sc(P,B), and thus, they all have values at least as large as v(bτ ). Similarly,
the users of Po all have costs at most as large as c(pτ ). Combining these observations, we get:
c(p) ≤ c(pτ ) < v(bτ ) ≤ v(b) for every p ∈ Po and b ∈ Bo.
The slots at locations 1 to |Bo∩B(A2)| of Sc(P (M2), B(A2)) all belong to Bo since Bo contains
the τ slots with the largest values. Similarly, the users at locations 1 to |Po ∩ P (M2)| belong to
Po. Combining both observations, we get that for every location 1 ≤ i ≤ min{|Po ∩ P (M2)|, |Bo ∩
B(A2)|}, the user p′i at location i of Sc(P (M2), B(A2)) and the slot b′i at this location belong to
Po and Bo, respectively, and thus, c(p
′
i) < v(b
′
i). Hence, by the definition a canonical assignment,
the pair (p′i, b
′
i) belongs to Sc(P (M2), B(A2)) for every 1 ≤ i ≤ min{|Po ∩ P (M2)|, |Bo ∩ B(A2)|};
which completes the proof of the first inequality we need to prove.
Assume towards a contradiction that the second inequality we need to prove is wrong. In other
words, we assume |Sc(P (M2), B(A2))| > max{|Po ∩ P (M2)|, |Bo ∩ B(A2)|}. Let j = max{|Po ∩
P (M2)|, |Bo∩B(A2)|}+1, and let p′j and b′j be the user and slot at location j of Sc(P (M2), B(A2)),
respectively. Our assumption implies that (p′j , b
′
j) belongs to Sc(P (M2), B(A2)), and thus, c(p
′
j) <
v(b′j). On the other hand, only the users at locations 1 to |Po∩P (M2)| of Sc(P (M2), B(A2)) belong
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to Po, hence, p
′
j does not belong to Po. The user with the lowest cost that does not belong to Po
is the user pτ+1 at location τ + 1 of Sc(P,B). Thus, we get: c(p
′
j) ≥ c(pτ+1). Similarly, we can
also get v(b′j) ≤ v(bτ+1), where bτ+1 is the slot at location τ +1 of Sc(P,B). Combining the above
inequalities gives:
c(pτ+1) ≤ c(p′j) < v(p′j) ≤ v(bτ+1) ,
which contradicts the fact that pτ+1 is not assigned to bτ+1 by the canonical assignment Sc(P,B).
The next few claims use the last observation to prove a few properties that hold given E ’.
Lemma 4.10. The event E ′ implies: Pˆ ⊆ Po and Bˆ ⊆ Bo.
Proof. We prove the first inclusion. The other inclusion is analogous. Observation 4.9 and the
definition of E ′ imply:
|Sc(P (M2), B(A2))| ≤ max{|Po ∩ P (M2)|, |Bo ∩B(A2)|}
≤ max{|Po|/2 + 3
√
α · τ, |Bo|/2 + 3
√
α · τ} = (1/2 + 3√α)τ .
Using the definition of E ′ again gives:
|Po ∩ P (M2)| ≥ |Po|/2− 3
√
α · τ = (1/2 − 3√α)τ
≥ (1− 4 3√α) · (1/2 + 3√α)τ ≥ (1− 4 3√α) · |Sc(P (M2), B(A2))| ,
which implies, since |Po ∩ P (M2)| is integral,
|Po ∩ P (M2)| ≥ ⌈(1− 4 3
√
α) · |Sc(P (M2), B(A2))|⌉ . (4)
If pˆ is a dummy user then Pˆ is empty, which makes the claim Pˆ ⊆ Po trivial. Thus, we may
assume that pˆ is the user at location ⌈(1− 4 3√α) · |Sc(P (M2), B(A2))|⌉ of the canonical assignment
Sc(P (M2), B(A2)). Hence, Inequality (4) and the observation that the users of Po ∩P (M2) are the
users with the lowest costs in P (M2) imply together that pˆ belongs to the set Po∩P (M2) ⊆ Po. On
the other hand, Po contains the τ users with the lowest costs. Hence, every user with a cost lower
than pˆ must be in Po since pˆ is in Po. The lemma now follows by observing that the definition of
Pˆ implies c(p) < c(pˆ) for every user p ∈ Pˆ .
Corollary 4.11. There exists a value ℓ(P,B) independent of the random coins of TPM such that:
• c(p) ≤ ℓ(P,B) ≤ v(b) for every user p ∈ Po and slot b ∈ Bo
• Whenever the event E ′ occurs, c(p) ≤ ℓ(P,B) ≤ v(b) for every user p ∈ Pˆ and slot b ∈ Bˆ.
Proof. Let ℓ(P,B) be the value of the slot at location τ of the canonical assignment Sc(P,B).
Clearly, ℓ(P,B) is independent of the random coins of TPM, as required. Additionally, for every slot
b ∈ Bo it holds that v(b) ≥ ℓ(P,B) since b must be located at some location of Sc(P,B) between 1
and τ . On the other hand, let pτ be the user at location τ of Sc(P,B). Since the size of Sc(P,B)
is τ , pτ must be assigned to the slot at location τ of Sc(P,B), which implies c(pτ ) ≤ ℓ(P,B).7
Moreover, for every user p ∈ Po it holds that c(p) ≤ c(pτ ) ≤ ℓ(P,B) since p must be located at
some location of Sc(P,B) between 1 and τ .
The lemma now follows since Lemma 4.10 shows that the event E ′ implies that every user p ∈ Pˆ
belongs also to Po, and every slot b ∈ Bˆ belongs also to Bo.
7In fact, we even have c(pτ ) < ℓ(P,B) since the tie-breaking rule defined in Section 2.1 guarantees that the value
of a slot is never equal to the cost of a user.
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Lemma 4.12. The event E ′ implies P˜ ∩ P (M1) ⊆ Pˆ and B˜ ∩B(A1) ⊆ Bˆ.
Proof. We prove the first inclusion. The other inclusion is analogous. The claim about P˜ ∩P (M1)
is trivial when P˜ is empty. Thus, we can assume throughout the proof that P˜ is non-empty.
Observation 4.9 and the definition of E ′ imply:
|Sc(P (M2), B(A2))| ≥ min{|Po ∩ P (M2)|, |Bo ∩B(A2)|}
≥ min{|Po|/2 − 3
√
α · τ, |Bo|/2− 3
√
α · τ} = (1/2 − 3√α)τ .
Recall that α ≥ τ−1, and thus, 3√α · τ ≥ 1. Using this inequality and the definition of E ′ again
gives:
|P˜ ∩ P (M2)| ≤ |P˜ |/2 + 3
√
α · τ = ⌈(1 − 11 3√α)τ⌉/2 + 3√α · τ ≤ (1/2 − 4 3√α)τ − 1 + 3√α · τ
= (1/2 − 3 3√α)τ − 1 ≤ (1− 4 3√α) · (1/2 − 3√α)τ − 1
≤ (1− 4 3√α) · |Sc(P (M2), B(A2))| − 1 ,
which implies, since |P˜ ∩ P (M2)| is integral,
|P˜ ∩ P (M2)| ≤ ⌈(1 − 4 3
√
α) · |Sc(P (M2), B(A2))|⌉ − 1 < ⌈(1− 4 3
√
α) · |Sc(P (M2), B(A2))|⌉ . (5)
Inequality (5) and the observation that the users of P˜ ∩ P (M2) are the users with the lowest
costs in P (M2) imply together that pˆ is a user of P (M2) which does not belong to P˜ ∩P (M2), and
therefore, does not belong to P˜ either. On the other hand, P˜ contains the ⌈(1 − 11 3√α)τ⌉ users
with the lowest costs. Hence, every user p ∈ P˜ has a cost smaller than c(pˆ) since pˆ does not belong
to P˜ . The lemma now follows by observing that the definition of Pˆ implies that p ∈ Pˆ for every
user p ∈ P (M1) obeying c(p) < c(pˆ).
Corollary 4.13. The event E ′ implies: −6.5 3√α · τ ≤ |Pˆ | − τ/2 ≤ 3√α · τ and −6.5 3√α · τ ≤
|Bˆ| − τ/2 ≤ 3√α · τ .
Proof. We prove here only the bounds on the size of Pˆ . The bounds on the size of Bˆ are analogous.
By Lemma 4.10, Pˆ ⊆ Po. On the other hand, by definition, Pˆ ⊆ P (M1). Thus, we get: Pˆ ⊆
Po ∩ P (M1). Combining this inclusion with the definition of E ′ gives:
|Pˆ | ≤ |Po ∩ P (M1)| = |Po| − |Po ∩ P (M2)|
≤ |Po| − [|Po|/2− 3
√
α · τ ] = |Po|/2 + 3
√
α · τ = τ/2 + 3√α · τ .
On the other hand, by Lemma 4.12 and the definition of E ′,
|Pˆ | ≥ |P˜ ∩ P (M1)| = |P˜ | − |P˜ ∩ P (M2)| ≥ |P˜ | − [|P˜ |/2 + 3
√
α · τ ]
= |P˜ |/2 − 3√α · τ ≥ ⌈(1− 11 3√α)τ⌉/2− 3√α · τ ≥ τ/2− 6.5 3√α · τ .
We can now define the event E1 referred to by Lemma 4.4. The event E1 is the event that E ′
happens and in addition the following two inequalities also hold:
(i) |Bˆ \B(AL)| ≤ |Pˆ | (ii) |Pˆ \ P (ML)| ≤ |Bˆ|
Next, let us prove Lemma 4.4. For ease of the reading, we first repeat the lemma itself.
Lemma 4.4. There exists an event E1 of probability at least 1− 10e−2/ 3
√
α such that E1 implies the
following:
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(i) B˜ ∩B(A1) ⊆ Bˆ (iii) |Pˆ \ P (ML)| ≤ |Bˆ|
(ii) P˜ ∩ P (M1) ⊆ Pˆ (iv) |Bˆ \B(AL)| ≤ |Pˆ |
(v) c(p) ≤ ℓ(P,B) ≤ v(b) for every user p ∈ Pˆ and slot b ∈ Bˆ, where
ℓ(P,B) is a value which is independent of the random coins of TPM
and obeys c(p) ≤ ℓ(P,B) ≤ v(b) for every p ∈ Po and b ∈ Bo.
Proof. By definition, the event E1 implies the inequalities: |Bˆ\B(AL)| ≤ |Pˆ | and |Pˆ \P (ML)| ≤ |Bˆ|.
Additionally, E1 implies the event E ′, which, by Corollary 4.11 and Lemma 4.12, implies the other
things that should follow from E1 by the lemma. Hence, the only thing left to prove is that the
probability of E1 is at least 1− 10e−2/ 3
√
α.
If 17 3
√
α ≥ 1, then AL = A and ML = M , which implies that the two inequalities |Bˆ \B(AL)| ≤
|Pˆ | and |Pˆ \ P (ML)| ≤ |Bˆ| are trivial. Hence, the events E1 and E ′ are equivalent in this case,
and thus, the probability of E1 is at least 1− 8e−2/ 3
√
α by Observation 4.8. Therefore, it is safe to
assume in the rest of the proof that 17 3
√
α < 1.
Our plan is to prove the inequality Pr[E1 | E ′] ≥ 1−2e−2/ 3
√
α. Notice that this inequality indeed
implies the lemma since it implies:
Pr[E1] = Pr[E ′] · Pr[E1 | E ′] ≥ (1− 8e−2/ 3
√
α) · (1− 2e−2/ 3
√
α) ≥ 1− 10e−2/ 3
√
α .
The event E ′ is fully determined by way TPM partitions M and A into M1,M2, A1 and A2.
Thus, it is enough to show that for every fixed partition for which the event E ′ holds, the event E1
holds with probability at least 1 − 2e−2/ 3
√
α. Notice that the sets Pˆ and Bˆ become deterministic
once we fix the partition of A and M . Hence, either |Bˆ| ≤ |Pˆ |, which implies that the inequality
|Bˆ \ B(AL)| ≤ |Pˆ | holds regardless of the choice of AL, or |Pˆ | ≤ |Bˆ|, which implies that the
inequality |Pˆ \ P (ML)| ≤ |Bˆ| holds regardless of the choice of ML. In both cases, all we need to
show is that the other inequality holds with probability at least 1−2e−2/ 3
√
α over the random choice
of AL and ML.
Let us assume, without loss of generality, that |Bˆ| ≤ |Pˆ |. By the above discussion, all we need
to prove is that Pr[|Pˆ \ P (ML)| ≤ |Bˆ|] ≥ 1 − 2e−2/ 3
√
α, where the probability is over the random
choice of ML. By Corollary 4.13:
Pr[|Pˆ \ P (ML)| > |Bˆ|] ≤ Pr[|Pˆ \ P (ML)| > τ/2− 6.5 3
√
α · τ ]
≤ Pr[|Pˆ \ P (ML)| > (1− 17 3
√
α)(τ/2 + 3
√
α · τ) + 3√α · τ ]
≤ Pr[|Pˆ \ P (ML)| > (1− 17 3
√
α) · |Pˆ |+ 3√α · τ ] .
Notice now that Pˆ \ P (ML) has the same distribution as Pˆ [1− 17 3
√
α]. Hence, by Lemma 4.7:
Pr[|Pˆ \ P (ML)| > |Bˆ|] ≤ Pr[|Pˆ \ P (ML)| > (1− 17 3
√
α) · |Pˆ |+ 3√α · τ ]
≤ Pr[||Pˆ [1− 17 3√α]| − (1− 17 3√α) · |Pˆ || > 3√α · τ ] ≤ 2e−2/ 3
√
α .
5 Conclusions
We considered mechanisms for double-sided markets that interact with strategic players where at
least one side of the market has players with multi-dimensional strategic spaces. In particular, we
explored the question of how many sides of the market can have players with multi-dimensional
strategic spaces, while still allowing for mechanisms that both maintain the desired basic economic
properties (individual rationality, incentive compatibility and budget balance) and suffer only a
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(small) bounded loss compared to the socially optimal outcome. To answer this question we pre-
sented two mechanisms. One mechanism that is deterministic and allows one side to have players
with multi-dimensional strategic spaces, and another mechanism that is randomized and allows two
sides to have players with multi-dimensional strategic spaces.
Our mechanisms significantly extend the literature on trade reduction—a technique used to
achieve the basic economic properties of individual rationality, incentive compatibility and budget
balance in a multi-sided market. While all the previous trade reduction solutions dealt with players
having single dimensional strategic spaces, our deterministic algorithm performs a non-binary trade
reduction which leads to the first trade reduction solution applying to multi-dimensional strategic
spaces. As given, this deterministic trade reduction solution deals with two sides: advertisers and
mediators; however, we believe that our ideas are more general, and we currently work on extending
the mechanism in order to handle more market sides.
From a more practical point of view, our study is motivated by a foreseeable future form of
online advertising in which users are incentivized to share their information via participation in a
mediated online advertising exchange. Our model captures some of the challenges introduced by
such exchanges, but does not encompass their online nature. In this sense our results in this paper
can be seen as a step towards the study of a more realistic model which also captures the online
nature of ad exchanges.
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